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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

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9 IN RE: Bard IVC Filters Products Liability
10 Litigation,
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No. MDL 15-02641-PHX DGC
ORDER

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14 This multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) involves thousands of personal injury
15 cases related to inferior vena cava (“IVC”) filters manufactured and marketed by
16 Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, “Bard”).
17 Bard has filed a motion to exclude the opinions of Rebecca Betensky, Ph.D. Doc. 7288.
18 The motion is fully briefed, and the Court heard arguments on January 19, 2018.
19 The Court will deny the motion.

20 **I. Background.**

21 The IVC is a large vein that returns blood to the heart from the lower body. IVC
22 filters are small metal devices implanted in the IVC to catch blood clots before they reach
23 the heart and lungs. IVC filters, such as Bard’s Simon Nitinol Filter (“SNF”), originally
24 were designed to be implanted permanently. Because some patients need only temporary
25 filters, however, medical device manufacturers such as Bard developed retrievable filters.
26 Bard first marketed a retrievable filter in 2003. Seven different versions of Bard
27 retrievable filters are at issue in this MDL – the Recovery, G2, G2 Express, G2X,
28 Eclipse, Meridian, and Denali.

EXHIBIT
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1 Each Plaintiff in this MDL was implanted with a Bard retrievable filter and claims
2 it is defective and has caused serious injury or death. Plaintiffs allege that the filters tilt,
3 perforate the IVC, or fracture and migrate to neighboring organs. Plaintiffs claim that
4 Bard filters are more dangerous than other IVC filters, and that Bard failed to warn about
5 the higher risks. Plaintiffs assert a host of state law claims, including manufacturing and
6 design defects, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and consumer fraud and unfair trade
7 practices. Doc. 303-1. Bard disputes Plaintiffs' allegations, contending that overall
8 complication rates for Bard filters are comparable to those of other IVC filters and that
9 the medical community is aware of the risks associated with IVC filters.

10 Plaintiffs have identified Dr. Betensky, a biostatistician, as an expert witness
11 regarding risk rates associated with Bard filters. Dr. Betensky is the director of
12 biostatistics programs at Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard University. She is
13 a faculty member at the Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sciences and Technology, has
14 taught courses in biostatistics at Harvard School of Public Health, and has authored more
15 than 200 peer-reviewed articles related to biostatistics. *See* Doc. 7818 at 4 n.4.

16 In this MDL, Dr. Betensky opines generally that there is a higher risk of adverse
17 events for Bard's retrievable IVC filters than for its permanent SNF. Doc. 7290.
18 Dr. Betensky relied on sales information provided by Bard and adverse event reports
19 extracted from the MAUDE database maintained by the Food and Drug Administration
20 ("FDA").¹ Dr. Betensky compared, over multiple time periods, the proportion of adverse
21 event reports for each Bard retrievable filter relative to sales, to the proportion of adverse
22 event reports for the SNF over sales. *Id.* at 2. She calculated a "reporting risk ratio"
23 ("RRR") as the ratio of the reporting risk for each retrievable filter to that of the SNF,

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25 ¹ The MAUDE database houses adverse event reports submitted to the FDA by
26 medical device manufacturers, hospitals and healthcare professionals, and patients and
27 consumers. *See FDA, MAUDE – Manufacture and User Facility Device Experience*,
28 <https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/search.cfm> (last updated
Dec. 31, 2017; last visited Jan. 16, 2018). Reporting by patients and consumers is
voluntary, but manufacturers and hospitals must submit reports when they become aware
of information that reasonably suggests that a device may have caused or contributed to a
death or serious injury. *See id.*

1 using this equation: $RRR = (x_1/n_1)/(x_2/n_2)$.² The RRR is then used as an estimate of
2 the actual risk ratio (“RR”) for the various filters. An RRR value larger than 1 suggests a
3 higher RR for the retrievable filters than for the SNF. *Id.* at 4. Dr. Betensky found that
4 for each Bard retrievable filter, there were statistically significant increased RRRs for
5 adverse events such as death due to filter embolization and filter fracture, migration,
6 perforation, or tilt. *Id.* at 3, 8-12, 15.

7 Defendants challenge Dr. Betensky’s opinions on several grounds. Defendants
8 contend that she applied unfounded assumptions in her calculations, resulting in biased
9 opinions that may not reflect an actual increased risk for retrievable filters. Defendants
10 further contend that the opinions are flawed because Dr. Betensky failed to consider
11 potential adverse events from the first ten years the SNF was on the market, or rule out
12 alternative explanations for the increased risk she estimated. Finally, Defendants contend
13 that the opinions are based solely on an improper comparison of anecdotal adverse event
14 reports contrary to express guidance from the FDA. Doc. 7288 at 2.³ Plaintiffs oppose
15 the motion, arguing that Dr. Betensky is a highly-qualified expert who considered all
16 available data and used a reliable methodology to form her opinions. Doc. 7818. For
17 reasons stated below, the Court finds that Defendants’ criticisms, to the extent valid, go
18 the weight to be afforded the opinions, not their admissibility.

19 **II. Legal Standard.**

20 Under Rule 702, a qualified expert may testify on the basis of “scientific,
21 technical, or other specialized knowledge” if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand
22 the evidence,” provided the testimony rests on “sufficient facts or data” and “reliable
23 principles and methods,” and “the witness has reliably applied the principles and methods
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26 ² In the equation, x_1 and n_1 denote, respectively, the number of adverse event
27 reports and sales for the retrievable filter, while x_2 and n_2 denote the same information
for the SNF.

28 ³ Page citations are to the numbers placed at the top of each page by the Court’s
electronic filing system.

1 to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)-(d). An expert may be qualified to testify
2 based on his or her “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” *Id.*

3 The proponent of expert testimony has the ultimate burden of showing that the
4 expert is qualified and the proposed testimony is admissible under Rule 702. *See Lust v.*
5 *Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.*, 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996). The trial court acts as a
6 gatekeeper to assure that expert testimony “both rests on a reliable foundation and is
7 relevant to the task at hand.” *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 597
8 (1993). Rule 702’s requirements, and the court’s gatekeeping role, apply to all expert
9 testimony, not only to scientific testimony. *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S.
10 137, 147 (1999).

11 **III. Discussion.**

12 **A. Assumptions About Adverse Event Reporting.**

13 Dr. Betensky’s expert report acknowledges and discusses potential limitations in
14 her analysis. Doc. 7290 at 12-14. These include the possibility that adverse events were
15 underreported for one or more of the devices at issue. Dr. Betensky found that while the
16 RRRs she calculated may involve some degree of underreporting, which makes them
17 “imperfect estimates of the actual risk ratios,” there is strong evidence that actual risk
18 ratios are higher for Bard retrievable filters than for the SNF. *Id.* at 13. Dr. Betensky
19 explained her reasoning as follows:

20 [A]dverse events are generally considered to be underreported to the
21 databases, and potentially differentially by severity of adverse event and by
22 drug or medical device. . . . It is important to recognize that underreporting
23 in and of itself is not problematic. Rather, differential underreporting of the
24 higher risk device is what leads to bias. And even if there was differential
25 underreporting of the higher risk device, given the variation in reporting
26 relative risks across adverse events, the differential reporting would have
27 had to have been highly variable across adverse events. This does not seem
28 plausible given the severity of the adverse events considered. Given the
magnitude of the RRR’s, and their variability across adverse events, it
seems implausible that differential underreporting by filter could fully
explain the deviation of the observed RRR’s from 1.

1 *Id.* at 12. Dr. Betensky further explained that if Bard “believed that there truly was no
2 elevation in risk associated with Recovery due to SNF, but that all of the signals of
3 elevated reporting risk were due to differential underreporting, it seems likely that they
4 would have increased their monitoring and corrected this problem, especially if
5 underreporting of SNF were due to decreased detection due to its permanence.” *Id.* at 13.

6 Dr. Betensky considered and addressed the possible influence of the Weber effect,
7 which results from increased reporting soon after the launch of a new drug or device. *Id.*
8 at 14. She concluded that the Weber effect does not appear to be at work in the data she
9 analyzed because “the RRR’s mostly increase over time.” *Id.*

10 Dr. Betensky further considered whether the incidence of adverse event reporting
11 could have been influenced by publicity, a phenomenon known as the “notoriety effect”
12 or “stimulated reporting.” *Id.* She found that the only possible cause of such an effect
13 would be an FDA warning letter about Bard filters, but concluded that the letter did not
14 affect the data she used because the letter was issued in 2015 and the data she used ended
15 in 2014. *Id.* at 2, 14.

16 Defendants argue that Dr. Betensky’s assumptions about adverse event reporting
17 are unreliable because she is not a doctor or an expert in any scientific field other than
18 statistics, and did not collaborate with a medical expert. Doc. 7288 at 8-11. Defendants
19 base this argument on the following assertion: “Determining whether or not assumptions
20 about detection and reporting of adverse events in retrievable and permanent filters are
21 ‘plausible’ requires an expert understanding of these complex medical devices and their
22 uses.” *Id.* at 8. But Defendants provide no citation for this assertion – from their own
23 statistical expert, medical literature, or case law – and it is not apparent to the Court that
24 the assertion is correct.

25 Dr. Betensky is a highly trained and qualified expert in *biostatistics*, and, as she
26 testified, has “25 years of experience as a Ph.D.-level statistician who has collaborated
27 extensively with investigators in the medical field.” *Id.* at 9. The Court cannot conclude
28 that she is unqualified to make reasonable assumptions in her statistical analyses. Dr.

1 Betensky explained her assumptions, acknowledged their shortcomings, and engaged in
2 sensitivity and other statistical inquiries to test their validity. Doc. 7290 at 12-15. Her
3 opinions are not, as Defendants assert, based solely on “her *ipse dixit*.” *Id.* at 2, 11 (citing
4 *G.E. v. Joiner*, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). This “is not a case where ‘there is simply too
5 great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.’” *In re Trasyolol*
6 *Prods. Liab. Litig.*, No. 08-MD-01928, 2010 WL 1489793, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24,
7 2010) (quoting *Joiner*, 522 U.S. at 146). If Defendants believe Dr. Betensky’s
8 assumptions are incorrect (Doc. 7288-3 at 11-12), they can make that assertion through
9 their own statistical expert, Dr. Ronald Thisted (Doc. 8175-4), and can cross examine
10 Dr. Betensky.

11 Each side has presented a highly qualified statistical expert to opine on the
12 available data about Bard IVC filter failure rates. Dr. Betensky readily acknowledges the
13 assumptions used in her analysis and explains why she believes they are reasonable. She
14 also acknowledges the shortcomings in available data, and admits that she can develop
15 only an estimate of filter risks. But she explains carefully why she believes her estimates
16 are reliable, using statistical techniques to test the estimates and her assumptions. Bard’s
17 expert, Dr. Thisted, reaches different conclusions, and carefully explains why.

18 The Court concludes that this testimony, from two well-qualified experts in
19 statistics, addressing the only data available on comparative risk rates of Bard IVC filters,
20 is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and *Daubert*. “It is not the job of the court to
21 insure that the evidence heard by the jury is error-free,” but to insure that it is sufficiently
22 reliable to be considered by the jury. *Southwire Co. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.*, 528 F.
23 Supp. 2d 908, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2007); *see Trasyolol*, 2010 WL 1489793, at *7 (the court
24 “must be careful not to conflate questions of admissibility of expert testimony with the
25 weight appropriately to be accorded to such testimony by the fact finder”). Applying the
26 factors identified in Rule 702, the Court finds that Dr. Betensky’s evidence meets this
27 standard. *See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.*, MDL No. 1014, 1997
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1 WL 230818, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1997) (noting that “there is no such thing as a perfect
2 epidemiological study”); *In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 289 F.
3 Supp. 1230, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“Because the court finds the methodology
4 scientifically sound, any flaws that might exist go to the weight afforded the [study], not
5 its admissibility.”).

6 **B. Adverse Events for the SNF and Alternative Explanations.**

7 Defendants argue that Dr. Betensky’s analysis is fatally flawed because she
8 considered adverse event reports and sales data for each retrievable filter starting at
9 product launch, but considered no data for the first ten years the SNF was on the market
10 (1990-2000). Doc. 7288 at 11. This omission is particularly egregious, Defendants
11 contend, given that, under the Weber effect, increased reporting can be observed soon
12 after product launch. *Id.* at 11-12. Defendants claim that had Dr. Betensky considered
13 the missing data, she may not have estimated any increased risk in reporting for
14 retrievable filters. *Id.* at 12. Defendants also argue that Dr. Betensky failed to account
15 for differences between retrievable filters and the SNF in terms of detecting
16 asymptomatic adverse events. *Id.* at 12-13.

17 Defendants argue that pre-2000 SNF data were available to Dr. Betensky on
18 specific spreadsheets Defendants produced to Plaintiffs. Doc. 8221 at 5-6. Significantly,
19 however, Defendants make no attempt to show that the data would have altered
20 Dr. Betensky’s conclusions. They make no calculations with the data. Defendants speak
21 only in terms of possibilities, asserting that it is “entirely possible” that data from the first
22 decade of SNF would have altered her conclusions. Docs. 7288 at 12, 8221 at 3. The
23 Court cannot conclude that Dr. Betensky’s opinions are unreliable on the basis of mere
24 possibilities. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this argument is suitable for cross
25 examination at trial, not for exclusion under Rule 702. Doc. 7818 at 14.

26 **C. Anecdotal Adverse Event Reports.**

27 Defendants contend that Dr. Betensky’s opinions are inadmissible because they
28 are based on anecdotal adverse event reports that were made either directly to Bard or

1 that Bard retrieved from the MAUDE database. Doc. 7288 at 13. Reliance on MAUDE
2 data is problematic, Defendants claim, because the “database is a ‘passive surveillance
3 system [that] has limitations, including the potential submission of incomplete,
4 inaccurate, untimely, unverified, or biased data.’” *Id.* at 13-14; *see* Doc. 288-5 at 2.
5 Defendants note that the FDA itself has cautioned that “MAUDE data is not intended to
6 be used either to evaluate rates of adverse events or to compare adverse event occurrence
7 rates across devices” (Doc. 7288-4 at 2), and has suggested, in the context of
8 pharmaceutical drugs, that “comparison of two or more reporting rates be viewed with
9 extreme caution” (Doc. 7288-6 at 15). *Id.* at 15-16.

10 Plaintiffs counter that Dr. Betensky did not use MAUDE data, but relied instead
11 on Bard’s own internal adverse event and sales data which Bard witnesses have
12 confirmed to be complete, accurate, and reliable. Doc. 7818 at 5-7. Plaintiffs also note
13 that Bard relies on the same data, the FDA recommends that manufacturers use such data
14 to conduct reporting rate analyses, and implanting physicians have published similar
15 analyses of IVC filters. *Id.* at 4-10. Plaintiffs also assert that other lines of evidence
16 support Dr. Betensky’s opinion that there is a higher risk of adverse events for Bard’s
17 retrievable IVC filters than for the SNF. *Id.* at 10-12.

18 The Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments. Dr. Betensky used the only
19 available evidence on Bard filter failure rates – evidence that Bard compiled internally
20 and through MAUDE, and that Bard used internally to make failure rate comparisons.
21 Of course, the fact that this is the only available evidence does not mean that opinions
22 based on it must be admitted; unreliable evidence should not be admitted solely because
23 other evidence cannot be obtained. But Dr. Betensky readily concedes the limitations in
24 the data she used and openly confirms that she has developed an estimate of failure rates,
25 not completely accurate failure rates. She explains, as an expert biostatistician, why her
26 estimates nonetheless reliably suggest that Bard’s retrievable filters fail more often than
27 the SNF.

1 The Court cannot conclude that statisticians should be permitted to testify only
2 when they can derive rock-solid truth. In fact, statisticians would not been needed if such
3 truth was discernable. Statisticians deal in probabilities, trends, and mathematically
4 supported inferences. The Court finds that Dr. Betensky is eminently qualified to provide
5 such opinions, that she does not overstate her findings, that she clearly explains the basis
6 for her assumptions and conclusions, and that the jury should be permitted to hear and
7 evaluate her opinions in light of Defendants' criticisms and counter-expert.

8 "Under *Daubert*, an expert need not base his or her opinion on the best possible
9 evidence, regardless of availability, but upon 'good grounds based on what is
10 known.'" *In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 645 F. Supp. 2d 164, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
11 (quoting *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 590). And *Daubert* makes clear that "disputes about the
12 facts underlying an expert's opinions are best addressed through the adversarial process
13 and then by the jury as the ultimate fact-finder." *In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig.*, MDL
14 No. 08-1943 (JRT), 2010 WL 8399942, at *11 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2010) (citing *Daubert*, 509
15 U.S. at 595-96).

16 Defendants cite *In re Accutane Products Liability Litigation*, 511 F. Supp. 2d
17 1288, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2007), which found an expert's reliance on adverse event reports
18 "unreliable as proof of causation because, in general, the events were not observed in
19 such a way as to rule out coincidence or other potential causes." But Dr. Betensky does
20 not present a causation opinion.⁴

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23 ⁴ The other cases cited by Defendants address either causation opinions or those
24 based on clearly unreliable evidence. See *Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp.*, 295 F.3d 1194,
25 1199 (11th Cir. 2002) (anecdotal case reports of patients suffering injuries after taking
26 prescription drug "did not by themselves provide reliable proof of causation"); *Allison v.*
27 *McGhan Med. Corp.*, 184 F.3d 1300, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding anecdotal studies
28 used to support medical causation unreliable "in the face of controlled, population-based
epidemiological studies which find otherwise"); *Haggerty v. Upjohn Co.*, 950 F. Supp.
1160, 1165 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (excluding causation opinion of pharmacologist who "did
not rely on the actual case reports, but only on secondary authorities summarizing the
primary clinical findings"); *In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig.*, No. 09-2051-MD,
2015 WL 392021, at *24 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2015) (finding the expert's summary of a
collection of case reports unreliable where it involved "layers of unsupportable
estimations and approximations added to [an] already shaky foundation").

1 Other courts have noted that adverse event reports, including reports from the
2 MAUDE database, may be used for opinions other than causation. *See Tillman v. C. R.*
3 *Bard, Inc.*, 96 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (allowing opinion in Bard IVC
4 filter case based on MAUDE data); *In re Gadolinium-Based Contrast Agents Prods.*
5 *Liab. Litig.*, No. 1:08 GD 50000, 2010 WL 1796334, at *11 (N.D. Ohio May 4, 2010)
6 (allowing expert testimony based in part on adverse event reports where the reports were
7 relied on by the FDA in reviewing relative risk, and noting that the defendant was “free
8 to cross-examine the . . . experts regarding the flaws in adverse event reporting”);
9 *Thompson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.*, No. 1:13-CV-00602, 2015 WL 7888387, at *5-7
10 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2015) (considering on summary judgment expert testimony based in
11 part on MAUDE data where the expert acknowledged that there are limitations to the
12 data); *In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, MDL
13 No. 2436, 2016 WL 3854534, at *26 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2016) (“No study is perfect nor
14 every piece of data entirely accurate. Any flaws in the [expert’s] analysis should be
15 brought out on cross-examination[.]”).⁵

16 **IT IS ORDERED** that Defendants’ motion to exclude the opinions of Rebecca
17 Betensky, Ph.D (Doc. 7288) is **denied**.

18 Dated this 22nd day of January, 2018.

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23 David G. Campbell
24 United States District Judge
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⁵ Because Defendants will have a full opportunity to cross examine Dr. Betensky and present their own statistical expert, the Court does not agree that admitting Dr. Betensky’s opinions will be unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. Doc. 7288 at 17.